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INTRODUCTION 
Failure to warn remains a doctrine in distress. More than two decades ago, we 
published an article criticizing the law governing product warnings for being little 
more than an “empty shell,” allowing claims that need only be asserted rhetorically 
to reach the jury.1 Afterward we served as reporters for the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts: Products Liability (“Restatement (Third)”), helping to write black-letter 
rules covering product warnings and a number of other subjects. Working on the 
Restatement (Third) project required coming to terms with the similarities and 
differences between defective design and failure to warn.2 One important difference 
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 1. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products 
Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265 (1990). The article 
was well received. See Seventy-Fifth Anniversary Retrospective: Most Influential Articles, 75 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1517, 1558 (2000) (recognizing the aforementioned article as one of the 
twenty-five most influential articles published by the New York University Law Review over 
the last seventy-five years). 
 2. In design cases, for example, it is no defense that the danger presented by the 
product is open and obvious; if an obvious danger can be avoided by the adoption of a 
reasonable alternative design, the product may be defective. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. d (1998); see also, e.g., Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 
571, 575 (N.Y. 1976). Where a claim is based on failure to warn, the claim fails if the danger 
presented by the product is open and obvious because the product’s obvious danger serves as a 
warning. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. j (1998); see also, e.g., 
Weiner v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 718 A.2d 305, 310 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998). Furthermore, 
“when a safer design can reasonably be implemented and risks can reasonably be designed out 
of a product, adoption of the safer design is required over a warning that leaves a significant 
238 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 90:237 
 
relates to what the plaintiff must prove to establish a product defect. Regarding 
design-based liability, except for designs that are manifestly self-defeating3 or that fail 
to conform to valid safety regulations,4 most American courts require plaintiffs to 
prove that (1) a specifically identified reasonable alternative design (RAD) was 
available at the time of commercial distribution, (2) failure to adopt the RAD rendered 
the design not reasonably safe, and (3) adoption of the RAD would have reduced or 
prevented the plaintiff’s harm.5 Regarding alleged failures to warn, many courts 
impose no parallel burdens on the plaintiff; in those jurisdictions, the plaintiff need 
only assert in conclusory fashion that the defendant’s warnings of nonobvious 
product-related risks were inadequate, without specifying exactly what warning the 
defendant should have given or proving that a different warning would have done any 
good.6 
The Restatement (Third) reflects this important difference by requiring a 
specifically identifiable RAD in its black-letter rule governing design while 
imposing no parallel requirement in connection with warning claims.7 With regard 
to failure to warn, neither the Restatement (Third) black letter nor the official 
comments explicitly require that the plaintiff articulate a reasonable alternative 
warning (RAW) in order to establish a prima facie case.8 Two reasons help to 
explain this difference in treatment. First, as will be discussed in Part II, much of 
the case law in the 1980s and ‘90s did not appear to impose a RAW requirement in 
connection with warnings. And second, in many failure-to-warn cases the 
                                                                                                                 
residuum of such risks.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. l (1998); see 
also, e.g., Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328, 336–37 (Tex. 1998). 
 3. Such self-defeating defects do not require the plaintiff to proffer a reasonable 
alternative design. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. b (1998); JAMES 
A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 189–
91 (7th ed. 2011); see also Michael D. Green, The Unappreciated Congruity of the Second and 
Third Torts Restatements on Design Defects, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 807 (2009). 
 4. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 4(a) (1998). 
 5. See David G. Owen, Design Defect Ghosts, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 927, 931 (2009) 
(recognizing that most jurisdictions require “only that manufacturers design their products as 
safe as they are reasonably able to do”); Aaron D. Twerski & James A. Henderson, Jr., 
Manufacturers’ Liability for Defective Product Designs: The Triumph of Risk-Utility, 74 
BROOK. L. REV. 1061, 1079–93 (2009) (surveying all jurisdictions and finding that an 
overwhelming majority require a showing of RAD). 
 6. See infra Part II. 
 7. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998) (referring to 
“the adoption of a reasonable alternative design” that would have reduced or avoided “the 
foreseeable risks of harm”), with id. § 2(c) (referring to “reasonable instructions or 
warnings” that could have “reduced or avoided” the “foreseeable risks of harm”). Although 
section 2(c) could be interpreted as imposing a RAW requirement, interpreting the absence 
of the word “alternative” in light of the official comments to section 2(c) would allow a court 
to focus on the shortcomings of the actual warnings without necessarily considering the 
specifics of a better alternative. See infra note 8. 
 8. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. i (1998) (indicating that 
the “plaintiff must prove that adequate instructions or warnings were not provided”). Not 
only is this instruction compatible with the plaintiff not suggesting a RAW, but the same 
comment may be seen implicitly to denigrate the notion of the plaintiff offering a RAW 
when it asserts that “the ability of a plaintiff to imagine a hypothetical better warning . . . 
does not establish that the warning actually accompanying the product was inadequate.” Id. 
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defendant’s marketing scheme provides no actual warning to which the plaintiff’s 
proposed warning could be said to be an “alternative.” All products are distributed 
with designs, but not all products are distributed with warnings. Thus it seemed to 
us and our advisers awkward to invoke the concept of an “alternative warning” as 
was done in connection with allegedly inadequate designs.9 For these reasons 
coupled with an underestimation of the stakes involved, the Restatement (Third) 
black-letter law and comments provide a less rigorous test for failure to warn than 
for defective design and allow courts to decide whether the plaintiff must specify 
what, by way of a more adequate instruction or warning about product-related 
risks, the defendant should have communicated to those who manage the relevant 
risks. Courts might have developed the concept of a RAW without explicit support 
from the Restatement (Third), and some have done so.10 But most have not.11 
As this Article will explain, we now conclude that the same rigor necessary for 
the plaintiff to establish a prima facie design defect case should be required for 
alleged failures to warn. The plaintiff asserting a warning claim should be required 
to specify (by suggesting a RAW) exactly how the defendant or a predecessor in the 
distributive chain should have effectively communicated product-related risks, and 
to prove (subject to an appropriately adjusted version of the heeding presumption)12 
how the RAW would have reduced or prevented the plaintiff’s harm. From a broader 
perspective (perhaps aided and abetted by our earlier work), too much has been 
made of the differences between design and warning, and not enough has been made 
of their similarities. This Article aims to set things right. Part I establishes the 
conceptual groundwork for this adjustment in perspective. It explains how, 
notwithstanding some interesting differences, design and warning claims share very 
similar foundations. Part II demonstrates that the failure to provide a RAW has 
resulted in the imposition of liability without proof of causation. Part III discusses 
cases that actually require a RAW. Part IV sets forth our proposal for a RAW. 
I. DESIGN AND WARNING CLAIMS SHARE THE SAME FOUNDATIONAL ELEMENTS 
The objective here is to describe the basic elements that product design and 
warning claims share and explain how those elements serve similar risk-reduction 
functions. This analysis is essentially descriptive; it does not attempt to connect risk 
reduction with overarching normative goals, such as efficiency or fairness. It 
assumes that others have made or will make those connections and is content to 
demonstrate that both design and warning claims, rooted in generic product risks, 
share similar elements that function similarly in reaching the same risk-reduction 
ends.13 Based on this demonstration, the analysis concludes that the legal doctrines 
                                                                                                                 
 
 9. In drafting the Restatement (Third), the American Law Institute appointed an 
official group of advisers drawn from plaintiff and defense bar, the judiciary, and law 
professors with expertise in the field of products liability. They met regularly with the 
reporters and reviewed all section and comment drafts. For a list of these reporters and 
advisers, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB., at v (1998). 
 10. See infra Part III. 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. See infra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 13. This instrumental commitment to risk reduction does not mean that products liability 
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governing both design and warning claims should, based on their shared internal 
logic, be treated in basically the same fashion. As this Article will make clear, the 
earlier analyses of the practical differences between design and warning litigation 
remain valid, but the failure of those analyses to adequately acknowledge the 
theoretical, foundational similarities, and thus the legitimacy of a RAW 
requirement, must be corrected. Manufacturing defects are not considered in this 
analysis because they do not involve generic risks; while remedies for such defects 
aim toward risk reduction, they do so by taking a different path that calls for 
different doctrinal treatment.14 And proximate causation is similarly omitted; it is 
an element shared by all tort claims and sheds no light on a comparison between 
product design and failure to warn.15 
A. An Overview of Liability for Generic Product Risks: The Building Blocks 
of Defect and Actual Causation 
Both design and warning claims are premised on the primary building-block 
concept of the untaken precaution—a generic safety feature that, when omitted by the 
commercial product distributor, renders the product not reasonably safe.16 In the 
products liability context, the omitted safety feature is a hypothetical adjustment in 
the product actually distributed—a marginally safer design or better warning that the 
plaintiff insists should have been adopted by the distributor or a predecessor.17 It does 
not include an entirely different category of product that might have been substituted 
for the product distributed by the defendant.18 The concept of the untaken precaution 
originated in negligence law,19 but it is equally relevant under strict liability as the 
doctrinal basis of liability for generic product defects.20 The point here is simply that, 
                                                                                                                 
necessarily reflects the ultimate goal of achieving allocative efficiency. Even if the ultimate 
goal were achieving fairness or justice, risk reduction could be a means of achieving those 
noninstrumental goals. See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 50 
UCLA L. REV. 621, 629 (2002) (suggesting that instrumental means are compatible with 
noninstrumental ends as long as they are conceptually sequenced so that the former give way 
when the two come into conflict). 
 14. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 68–75 (1970) (explaining how imposing strict liability for harm caused by 
manufacturing defects achieves “general” or market deterrence whereby, once defect-related 
accident costs are shifted to commercial product distributors, marketplace competition 
pressures distributors to achieve optimal levels of both quality control and production). 
 15. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 15 (1998) (taking no specific 
position on causation in products liability cases, but referring generally to prevailing rules 
and principles governing causation in tort).  
 16. See generally Mark F. Grady, Untaken Precautions, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1989) 
(suggesting that the untaken precaution is the central concept of negligence law). 
 17. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 18. American courts do not impose tort liability based on unreasonably unsafe 
categories of products. See generally James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing 
the American Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263 (1991). 
 19. See generally Grady, supra note 16. 
 20. Although many courts purport to impose “strict liability” for generic product defects, 
the defects are determined by an essentially fault-based analysis. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
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in connection with both design and warning claims under either negligence or strict 
liability, the plaintiff must establish that a safety feature that the defendant could have 
and should have adopted was omitted, thereby causing the product to be not 
reasonably safe. Historically, courts have chosen to distinguish between design and 
marketing defects, and we certainly have no quarrel with that choice.21 The 
conceptual distinction between mechanical defects and generic hazards is critical; but 
we now believe that too much has been made of the difference between design and 
failure to warn. Courts might have enhanced conceptual clarity by treating design and 
warning as subsets of a single concept of “generic defect.”22 
The second basic building block in products liability is actual causation.23 
Assuming that the plaintiff shows that the defendant or a predecessor should have 
adopted a particular generic safety feature, the plaintiff must also show that 
adoption of the feature would have made a difference—that it would have avoided 
part or all of the plaintiff’s harm. This element of actual causation divides into two 
sub-elements. Regarding the first of these sub-elements of causation (general 
causation), the safety feature proffered by the plaintiff must reduce the relevant 
risks of harm by changing the circumstances affecting would-be victims, which 
may include the behavior of persons who control the relevant risks.24 In virtually all 
cases other than those involving the systemic effects of drugs and other toxics—in all 
cases, for example, involving the traumatic effects of tangible products—this 
sub-element of general causation is not an issue.25 Once an omitted aspect of the 
product design or marketing of a tangible product qualifies as an untaken precaution, 
it must by definition be inherently capable of reducing the relevant risks of harm. 
Regarding the second sub-element of actual causation, commonly referred to as 
“specific causation,” the plaintiff must show that if the product distributor had adopted 
the hypothetical precaution, it would have prevented the relevant risks from 
materializing in harm to the particular plaintiff.26 This second sub-element is far more 
likely to be an issue than the first. Even if an untaken precaution would have reduced 
the relevant risks as a general matter, thereby satisfying the requirement of general 
causation, it may not have helped a particular plaintiff. In cases involving the traumatic 
effects of tangible products, these two sub-elements of actual causation tend to 
                                                                                                                 
TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. d (1998) (indicating that an approach under RAD analysis “is 
also used in administering the traditional reasonableness standard in negligence”). 
 21. Indeed, the authors embraced this distinction in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
PRODS. LIAB. § 2 (1998). 
 22. Design and failure to warn would have been important subsets. As suggested earlier, 
manufacturing defects are not generic but rather exist in individual product units. See 
HENDERSON & TWERSKI, supra note 3, at ix (organizing the topics of manufacturing defects 
and generic product risks in separate parts, the latter of which contains separate chapters 
covering design and warnings). 
 23. See id. at 154–67; DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 11.1 at 732 n.17 
(2005). 
 24. A proffered safety feature may affect the circumstances of product use by either 
building into the design a tangible, harm-avoidance measure or helping, by warnings or 
otherwise, to induce safer behavior on the parts of product users, consumers, and others who 
are in positions to reduce risks.  See HENDERSON & TWERSKI, supra note 3, at 171–80. 
 25. See JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR., RICHARD N. PEARSON & DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, THE 
TORTS PROCESS 110–11 (8th ed. 2012). 
 26. See HENDERSON & TWERSKI, supra note 3, at 126–27. 
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collapse into a single “but for the lack of the safety feature” element. But in many 
cases involving chemically induced systemic harms, distinguishing between general 
risk reduction and the prevention of particular harm improves analytical clarity.27 
B. The Building Blocks in Action: Design and Warning Claims Are More Similar 
Than They Might at First Appear 
1. The Element of Product Defect 
As we made clear more than twenty years ago, untaken precautions in the form 
of omitted safety features in design-defect litigation typically call for expert 
application of the applied sciences and are relatively costly to implement.28 Thus, 
when the plaintiff claims that the defendant manufacturer’s motor vehicle should 
have been designed to include features that would give occupants a greater chance 
to survive high-speed collisions, both the cost of engineering the new risk-reducing 
design and the cost of prosecuting the claim in court are likely to be substantial.29 
Regarding the design features that the plaintiff insists should have been included, 
American courts require the plaintiff to prove with considerable exactness what the 
features are, how they would function to reduce risks of harm, and why the overall 
reductions in risks justify the costs of incorporating the safety features.30 Only in 
the relatively rare circumstance when a product design fails dangerously to perform 
its manifestly intended function—only when the design could be said to be 
“self-defeating”31—are the costs of untaken precautions likely to be modestly low. 
Compared with claims of unsafe design, claims that the marketing of the product 
was unreasonably unsafe often rely on untaken precautions that are significantly 
less costly for product manufacturers to implement. After all, how great could be 
the marginal costs of adding a few attention-grabbing verbal modifiers and an 
exclamation point or two? Although adding cautionary language to a marketing 
communication may on first encounter appear to be a relatively low-cost safety 
feature, it is fallacious to go so far as to say that warnings are by their nature 
practically cost free.32 Adding warnings and instructions may generate a variety of 
increased delivery costs33 and may cause the aggregate informational package to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 27. See, e.g., King v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 762 N.W.2d 24, 34 (Neb. 2009). 
 28. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 293. 
 29. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. f (1998) (reflecting 
concern for the costs of expert testimony by explicitly recognizing that neither experts nor 
prototypes are required in all cases). 
 30. See id. § 2 cmt. d (stating “[s]ubsection (b) adopts a reasonableness (‘risk-utility 
balancing’) test as the standard for judging the defectiveness of product designs”); see also, 
e.g., Smith v. Louisville Ladder Co., 237 F.3d 515, 518 (5th Cir. 2001); Timpte Indus., Inc. 
v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 311 (Tex. 2009). 
 31. See supra note 3. 
 32. See, e.g., Cotton v. Buckeye Gas Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 935, 937–38 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 
(rejecting the idea that additional warnings are “virtually cost free”); Henderson & Twerski, 
supra note 1, at 292–94. 
 33. See, e.g., Williams v. Super Trucks, Inc., 842 So. 2d 1210 (La. Ct. App. 2003) 
(finding that a warning could not be attached to a crankshaft); Broussard v. Cont’l Oil Co., 
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exceed the capacities of foreseeable consumers to understand and respond 
effectively.34 Moreover, variables such as how an adequate warning should have 
described the risk, the size and prominence of the warning, and the means by which 
the warning should have been communicated (e.g., verbal or pictorial, on the 
product or in a user’s manual) are crucial in deciding whether the warning proposed 
by the plaintiff would have been practically useful and worth its costs. Other 
product-related risks of equal or even greater magnitude may have also deserved 
warnings, which may have presented logistical difficulties as well as corresponding 
increases in costs and decreases in effectiveness.35 At the extreme, giving a 
multiplicity of warnings may lead consumers to disregard all of them.36 In the latter 
circumstance, the costs of additional warnings could be very great indeed. 
A caveat is in order. Even if increasing the scope or intensity of warnings is 
more costly than it might at first be assumed, supplying alternative product 
warnings is less costly than supplying alternative product designs in one important 
respect. The authors have explained elsewhere how the elements of product design 
are inescapably interdependent, such that changing one element usually creates 
ripple effects throughout many other elements and thus requires a rearrangement of 
essentially the entire design.37 The same implications are less likely to occur in 
connection with proposed changes in product warnings. The question of whether 
the marketing of a product might have included the identification of an additional 
risk or risk avoidance measure, or greater emphasis on certain risk information, is 
less likely to produce the sorts of ripple effects that create difficulties for courts.38 
Given that a large majority of courts impose a RAD requirement in connection 
with design defects,39 it is interesting that most courts have not traditionally 
required plaintiffs to assert a RAW—to specify exactly what the product distributor 
should have communicated by way of greater risk information.40 Requiring a RAD 
in design litigation sharpens the in-court analysis of what it would cost to make a 
design safer and whether it would have been worth those costs to make a design 
                                                                                                                 
433 So. 2d 354 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (finding that additional warnings would not fit on the 
handle of an electric drill). 
 34.  See generally A.D. Twerski, A.S. Weinstein, W.A. Donaher & H.R. Piehler, The 
Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products Liability—Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 
61 CORNELL L. REV. 495, 513–17 (1976). For a review of the social science literature that 
examines the efficacy of warnings and the variables that may affect end-user decisions as to 
how to use a product, see Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Resolving the Dilemma of 
Nonjusticiable Causation in Failure-To-Warn Litigation, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 125, 132–36 
(2010); see also Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 568 (1980) (“Meaningful 
disclosure does not mean more disclosure. Rather, it describes a balance between ‘competing 
considerations of complete disclosure . . . and the need to avoid . . . [informational 
overload].’” (alteration in original) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted)). 
 35. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text. 
 36. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 37. James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers’ Conscious Design 
Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1540 (1973); James A. 
Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Commentary, Stargazing: The Future of American 
Products Liability Law, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1332, 1335 & nn.18–20 (1991). 
 38. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 293. 
 39. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 40. See infra Part II. 
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safe enough to have reduced or prevented the plaintiff’s harm. Would requiring the 
plaintiff to specify a RAW in failure-to-warn litigation similarly affect a court’s 
cost-benefit assessment of whether the product distributor should have provided 
greater marketing safeguards? We submit that this might well be the case inasmuch 
as a “spell it out in detail” requirement would help to highlight the delivery costs 
and cognitive-overload considerations described earlier.41 Without a RAW 
requirement, the plaintiff is more likely to be able to have it both ways—to play up 
the need for a more forceful warning in the abstract while playing down or ignoring 
altogether the sorts of real-life costs, monetary and nonmonetary, that requiring 
more forceful warnings would generate. Plaintiffs cannot so easily play that sort of 
shell game with claims of bad design given the widespread requirement that the 
plaintiff establish a RAD.42 Requiring a RAW might have much the same effects in 
connection with claims of defective product marketing. 
Admittedly, requiring a RAW implies a measure of arbitrariness that requiring a 
RAD does not. Thus, a number (often a large number) of warning variations are 
typically available to product distributors by which to communicate information 
about a given risk, which is less likely to be the case in connection with design 
alternatives.43 It may seem to follow that requiring the plaintiff to choose one among 
an apparently large number of equally effective warning variations is arbitrary in a 
way that requiring a RAD is not.44 But such is not the case. Requiring the plaintiff to 
identify specifically what, how, and to whom the defendant-distributor should have 
communicated additional risk information quite legitimately contributes to achieving 
a more sensible, realistic assessment of the costs and benefits associated with 
providing allegedly better warnings. Not only would a RAW help to highlight the 
costs associated with a better warning,45 but a RAW would also help to reveal any 
weaknesses in the plaintiff’s claim of but-for causation.46 
2. The Element of General Causation 
The first of the two elements of actual causation—whether inclusion of the 
additional safety feature proffered by the plaintiff would have reduced the risks of 
harm to those in the plaintiff’s position—is clear in most instances.47 Assuming that 
the plaintiff has established that an omitted precaution should have been included 
in the design or marketing of the product, by definition the plaintiff will have 
                                                                                                                 
 
 41. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. 
 42. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 43. Given that the plaintiff may not offer a RAD in the form of a different product category, 
see supra note 18 and accompanying text, typically there are only a limited number of ways to 
adjust the defendant’s product marginally so as to have prevented or reduced the plaintiff’s harm. 
Regarding alternative warning claims, by contrast, the plaintiff may construct a wide range of 
better warnings, constrained only by common sense and the meaning of language. 
 44. With regard to a RAD, the plaintiff’s choices are obviously constrained by the 
existing design—there are only a limited number of ways that defendant’s design may be 
marginally adjusted. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 45. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text. 
 46. See infra text accompanying note 56. 
 47. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.  
2015] FIXING FAILURE TO WARN 245 
 
established that such inclusion would have reduced the relevant risks. The only 
exceptions involve harms caused systemically (rather than traumatically) by drugs, 
toxics, and other chemical compounds where, even if a given chemical should have 
been safer as a general proposition, it may be scientifically unclear whether the 
compound is capable of causing the sort of harm suffered by the plaintiff. 
In those cases, general causation is often a separately contested issue.48 
Interestingly, cases involving drugs and toxics are almost always brought by 
plaintiffs on the basis of alleged failures to warn.49 Thus, it is a fair assessment that 
general causation is an issue that, when it arises, almost always involves alleged 
failures to warn rather than defective designs. 
3. The Element of Specific Causation 
The second of the two elements of actual causation concerns whether inclusion 
of the risk-reducing safety feature proffered by the plaintiff would have prevented 
part or all of the particular plaintiff’s harm. Regarding design claims, the RAD 
proposed by the plaintiff may work to reduce or prevent harm without 
risk-reducing inputs from human actors such as persons using the product or 
bystanders exposed to harm as a consequence of product usage. Thus, a RAD may 
function to render a vehicle design more crashworthy without relying on drivers or 
would-be crash victims cooperating in any way.50 In that instance, the issue of 
specific causation would be whether, on the facts of the particular case, the added 
design safety provided by the RAD would have prevented the plaintiff’s harm. Of 
course, post-distribution cooperation from a risk manager (e.g., a user or consumer 
of the product) may be a necessary component of a plausible design-based scheme 
to prevent harm, as when a seat belt requires vehicle occupants to “buckle up.”51 
Regarding such design features, the plaintiff must show not only that the safety 
feature, once put in play, would have prevented harm, but also that a risk manager 
would have put the feature in play. To be sure, supplying seat belts in a vehicle 
reduces the risks of accident-related harm by offering buckle-up options; but 
passive passenger restraints such as air bags are thought to be more effective 
precisely because they function to prevent harm even when would-be accident 
victims are passively noncooperative.52 In effect, RADs that reduce risk without 
                                                                                                                 
 
 48. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 49. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 cmt. a (1998) (explaining that 
courts traditionally have imposed liability for generic risks of prescription drugs only in cases 
involving failures to warn). A recent trend favoring design-based liability for drug design rests 
on a fairly narrow rule. See id. § 6(c). See generally James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. 
Twerski, Essay, Drug Designs Are Different, 111 YALE L.J. 151 (2001). Liability for generic 
risks inherent in chemicals and other toxic raw materials is also traditionally based exclusively 
on failure to warn. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 5 cmt. c (1998). 
 50. Crash victims may contribute to risk reduction by avoiding crashes, but that sort of 
contribution does not render the vehicle design more crashworthy. 
 51. Threatening would-be victims with barriers to recovery based on contributory 
negligence and assumption of risk pressures them to cooperate. And pressuring defendant 
product sellers with liability based on failures to instruct and warn helps encourage cooperation. 
 52. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 876–81 (2000) (discussing the history 
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requiring the post-distribution cooperation of human beings paternalistically 
impose increased safety on would-be victims whether or not they like it or are even 
aware that risk reduction is happening. 
Regarding proposed safety features that consist of omitted warnings about 
product-related risks, altering the conduct of those to whom the warnings are 
addressed is always a necessary element of the harm-prevention scenario; increased 
safety from better product marketing can never be automatic or “forced,” as is often 
possible by the adoption of a safer product design. Thus, every failure-to-warn 
claim rests on an assertion by the plaintiff that, as with a seat belt that must be 
buckled to be effective, if the product distributor had supplied a more adequate 
warning, the person in control of the risk would have responded cooperatively and 
the response would have reduced or prevented the harm suffered by the plaintiff. It 
follows that just as air bags are, in a manner of speaking, preferable to seat belts 
because passive, designed-in restraints leave less opportunity for vehicle occupants 
willfully or inadvertently to expose themselves to risks of harm,53 design 
modifications, all else being equal, are preferable to marketing modifications from 
the standpoint of increasing product safety.54 
 In asserting a warning claim, the plaintiff must establish specific causation by 
showing that reasonable product marketing would have reduced or prevented his 
harm.55 Requiring the plaintiff to identify a RAW—to specify what the defendant 
should have issued by way of an adequate warning—would add to the clarity of the 
analysis necessary to determine but-for specific causation. Quite simply, proof of a 
RAW would allow the tribunal to compare the specifics of the RAW against the 
specifics of the actual marketing of the defendant’s product, instead of trying to intuit 
its way to a conclusion regarding specific causation based on vague allegations that 
some sort of unspecified warnings would have actually prevented the plaintiff’s 
harm.56 Answering the question of whether the addressee of a particular RAW would 
have responded cooperatively in an effort to prevent the plaintiff’s harm is inherently 
speculative, especially when the addressee is not available as a witness.57 Therefore, 
it would be appropriate for courts to recognize a presumption that a RAW would 
have made a difference, subject to rebuttal based on direct or circumstantial 
evidence.58 Such a presumption would be available only in connection with specific 
causation; it would make no sense in the context of general causation.59 
                                                                                                                 
of how automobile airbag regulations phased in passive restraints as preferable over seat belts). 
 53. Of course, air bags are not meant to replace seat belts; both are necessary to provide 
maximum protection in case of a crash. Yet unlike seat belts, air bags do not require the 
cooperation of the passenger to attain greater safety. 
 54. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. l (1998) (suggesting 
that a safer design is preferable over a warning that leaves significant residuum of risk). 
 55. See HENDERSON & TWERSKI, supra note 3, at 396–99. 
 56. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. Requiring a RAW would force plaintiffs to 
be more careful about selecting better warnings that would have prevented the harms in question. 
 57. This would be true when the addressee is either killed or severely disabled. 
 58. This is commonly referred to as the “heeding presumption.” The first case to adopt a 
heeding presumption was Technical Chemical Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 606 (Tex. 
1972). Other states have followed suit. See, e.g., Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Terre Haute First 
Nat’l Bank, 332 N.E.2d 820, 826 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975), rev’d on other grounds, 358 N.E.2d 
974 (Ind. 1976); Coffman v. Keene Corp., 628 A.2d 710, 720 (N.J. 1993); Seley v. G.D. 
Searle & Co., 423 N.E.2d 831, 838 (Ohio 1981); Cunningham v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 532 
2015] FIXING FAILURE TO WARN 247 
 
C. A Brief Summary: Some Differences Between Design and Warning Claims 
Matter More Than Others 
The foregoing analysis supports the conclusion that, notwithstanding the 
important practical differences identified elsewhere,60 design and warning defects 
comprise the same basic components functioning in essentially similar fashion: 
untaken precautions that would have increased the safety of product use and 
consumption and reduced or even prevented the plaintiffs’ harm. Many design 
precautions are—as all warning precautions are not—capable of reducing risks of 
harm without any cooperation on the part of users, consumers, or other risk 
managers. But besides supporting a general preference for reducing product risks 
by modifying designs rather than increasing warnings,61 this difference has no 
fundamental consequences relevant to this Article’s analysis. Nor does the fact that 
general causation traditionally arises only in the context of failure to warn.62 These 
differences support the notion that it is useful to maintain the traditional distinction 
between design and warning. But these differences do not justify imposing 
significantly different burdens on plaintiffs when establishing the centrally 
important element of product defect. Thus, based on this Article’s analysis, the 
same tort liability regime that requires a plaintiff in a design case to identify and 
prove a RAD should require the plaintiff in a warning case to identify and prove a 
RAW. The authors arguably should have built such a requirement into their earlier 
article and into the Restatement (Third), for which they served as reporters. The 
Restatement (Third) is consistent with a RAW requirement, but does not explicitly 
impose one.63 In any event, three tasks remain to be accomplished in the present 
endeavor: first, to use selected products liability decisions to demonstrate how a 
RAW requirement could improve failure-to-warn litigation; second, to identify case 
law that supports requiring the plaintiff to establish a RAW; and third, to describe 
what a RAW requirement should look like going forward. 
                                                                                                                 
P.2d 1377, 1382 (Okla. 1974). Several jurisdictions, however, have refused to adopt a 
heeding presumption. See, e.g., Latiolais v. Merck & Co., No. CV 06-02208 MRP (JTLx), 
2007 WL 5861354, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2007) (stating that no California court has 
adopted the heeding presumption); Lord v. Sigueiros, No. CV 040243, 2006 WL 1510408, at 
*3–4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 26, 2006); Riley v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 856 P.2d 196, 200 
(Mont. 1993); Rivera v. Philip Morris, Inc., 209 P.3d 271, 274–75 (Nev. 2009). Although the 
authors have expressed displeasure with the heeding presumption, see Henderson & 
Twerski, supra note 1, at 325–26, the thrust of this Article is that even with the presumption 
the plaintiff is still required to proffer a RAW. 
 59. General causation rests not on what a particular addressee would have done but on 
broader rules of physical science, which apply regardless of individual idiosyncrasies. 
 60. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 292–311. 
 61. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. l (1998). 
 62. See supra text accompanying notes 48–49. 
 63. See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text. 
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II. DECIDED CASES DO NOT REQUIRE PROOF OF A RAW: IMPOSING LIABILITY 
WITHOUT PROOF OF SPECIFIC CAUSATION 
From the onset of failure-to-warn litigation until quite recently, courts did not 
require the plaintiff to prove a RAW.64 To be sure, plaintiffs during this period 
often appear to have suggested warnings that defendants should have given 
attendant to the sale of their products,65 but courts have not required the kind of 
specificity that we have suggested in this Article.66 The focus for most courts has 
been the inadequacy of the warning given by the defendant; juries have been 
permitted to find causation based on their intuition that some undefined warning 
would have been read and heeded.67 Had the plaintiffs been required to set out a 
RAW with greater specificity, it is more likely that the defendants would have been 
granted judgment as a matter of law.68 Rather than focus on the size, placement, 
and intensity of an alternative warning, the plaintiffs were allowed to posit that 
some warning would have changed their behavior.69 
A much-cited early case illustrates how the traditional approach tended to 
eliminate any requirement of specific causation. In Moran v. Faberge, Inc.,70 the 
plaintiff, a seventeen-year-old girl, was visiting with friends on a warm summer 
night. After listening to music for a while, the group became bored.71 With nothing 
better to do, the girls turned their attention to a Christmas-tree-shaped candle that 
was positioned on a shelf behind the couch in the clubroom.72 The youngsters 
began to discuss whether the candle was scented.73 After agreeing that it was not, 
one of the plaintiff’s friends said “Let’s make it scented.”74 She grabbed a drip 
bottle of Tigress cologne manufactured by Faberge and began to pour its contents 
onto the candle somewhat below the flame.75 A burst of fire shot out from the 
candle, burning the plaintiff’s neck and breast.76 A jury found for the plaintiff and 
awarded her substantial damages.77 The trial judge granted Faberge’s motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict,78 which was subsequently upheld by an 
intermediate Maryland appellate court.79 On appeal, the Maryland Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                 
 
 64. To determine whether courts required a “reasonable alternative warning,” we searched 
both WestlawNext and Lexis Advance using “alternat!/2warn!/p ‘failure to warn’” as the basis 
of our search. The query was run in the database containing all state and federal cases. The 
search was limited to opinions written between January 1, 1970, and December 31, 1999. 
 65. See infra text accompanying notes 70–110. 
 66. See infra text accompanying notes 70–110. 
 67. See infra note 110. 
 68. See infra text accompanying notes 70–110. 
 69. See infra text accompanying notes 70–110. 
 70. 332 A.2d 11 (Md. 1975), rev’g 313 A.2d 527 (1974). 
 71. Id. at 13. 
 72. Id.  
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at n.2. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Moran v. Williams, 313 A.2d 527 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974), rev’d, 332 A.2d 11 
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reversed and reinstated the jury’s finding that Faberge had knowledge that cologne 
was a dangerous combustible product and that it was foreseeable that it might cause 
a fire.80 Tigress cologne had been accident-free for twenty-seven years.81 The 
vapors from the cologne become flammable only when positioned within 
one-quarter inch of an open flame.82 
The Maryland high court focused almost exclusively on the foreseeability of the 
cologne’s flammability.83 No one proposed a specific warning; the plaintiff simply 
argued that there was no warning that the cologne was flammable. But what should the 
warning have said and how emphatic should the warning have been? Should it have 
been a four-inch warning in blazing red that said “WARNING: COLOGNE IS 
FLAMMABLE”? Or should the warning have been written in smaller letters stating 
that cologne is flammable when brought within one-quarter inch of a flame? To create 
the impression that there was a huge danger of flammability from use of a drip bottle 
of cologne would have been a gross overstatement of the flammability of cologne. On 
the other hand, a warning written in smaller letters that cologne is flammable only 
when brought within one-quarter inch of a flame is less likely to be read or heeded. 
The plaintiff might have admitted that neither she nor her friend read the label but 
merely glanced at it before dousing the candle with the cologne. The plaintiff escaped 
these difficult specific causation questions because she did not have to propose a 
RAW. In any event, these considerations were lost on the Maryland Supreme Court. 
The judicial intuition that some unarticulated warning would have prevented her injury 
was, in the court’s view, sufficient to support a finding of causation. 
The failure of the plaintiff to set forth a RAW as part of his prima facie case was 
even more egregious in Liriano v. Hobart Corp.84 The plaintiff, a 
seventeen-year-old immigrant from the Dominican Republic, was injured while 
operating a Hobart meat grinder in a supermarket.85 The grinder was thirty years 
old and was originally equipped with a barrier guard permanently riveted onto the 
part of the machine in which meat was placed.86 The guard permitted small pieces 
of meat to enter the machine for grinding but protected the user from pushing his or 
her hand down toward the grinding mechanism.87 Shortly before the accident an 
                                                                                                                 
(Md. 1975). 
 80. Faberge, Inc., 332 A.2d at 21. 
 81. Id. at 24. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 16–21. 
 84. 170 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 1999). The facts of Liriano v. Hobart Corp., summarized in 
the text, are fully expounded in Brief of Defendant, 700 N.E.2d 303 (N.Y. 1998) (Nos. 
96-96441L & 97-7449), 1998 WL 34152546, at *2–5. It should be noted that Liriano v. 
Hobart Corp. had been litigated before the Second Circuit once before. Liriano v. Hobart 
Corp. (Liriano I), 132 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 1998). In Liriano I, the circuit certified to the New 
York Court of Appeals the question whether a manufacturer had a postsale duty to warn 
when there had been a substantial modification of the product that would have precluded 
liability for design defect. Id. The New York Court of Appeals answered that question in the 
affirmative, Liriano v. Hobart Corp. (Liriano II), 700 N.E.2d 303 (N.Y. 1998), and remanded 
the case to the Second Circuit to decide whether the verdict for the plaintiff based on failure 
to warn should be upheld. 
 85. Brief of Defendant, supra note 84, at *2. 
 86. Liriano I, 132 F.3d at 125. 
 87. Id.  
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employee of the supermarket sawed off the safety guard.88 The plaintiff, while 
feeding meat into the grinder, placed his hand so that it became enmeshed with the 
“grinding worm,” resulting in the amputation of his right hand and forearm.89 
The case was tried in federal district court solely on the ground that Hobart had 
knowledge that, over the years, other employers had removed similar safety guards 
on other machines and that Hobart failed to provide a postsale warning of the 
dangers of operating the grinder without a safety guard.90 The jury found for the 
plaintiff, and the defendant appealed the judgment to the Second Circuit.91 
Speaking for the majority, Judge Calabresi found that even if the danger were 
obvious (and thus not requiring a warning to the effect that injury might occur),92 
Hobart had a duty to warn employees that they need not accept the risks of using 
unguarded grinders.93 At no point in the court’s decision is there any discussion of 
the text of such a warning and where it should have been placed. It was enough that 
there was a failure to warn. However, the failure to specify the text and desired 
placement of a warning was crucial to resolving the causation issue. Would a 
warning that the employee need not accept the risks of an unguarded grinder have 
made a difference in this case? The plaintiff understood and read very little English 
at the time of the accident.94 Should the warning have been multilingual on every 
Hobart grinder? Was it possible to communicate the desired warning through the 
use of a pictorial? We doubt that a court forced to respond to these issues would 
have found adequate evidence of but-for causation.95 It was altogether too easy to 
move from a finding of inadequate warning to an intuitive finding of causation 
because the court did not deem it necessary to specify a RAW. 
Saladino v. Stewart & Stevenson Services, Inc.96 is another example where the 
court found it unnecessary for the plaintiff to specify a RAW, resulting in a 
questionable finding of specific causation. The plaintiff in Saladino was rendered a 
quadriplegic when a baggage tractor in which he was sitting approached an aircraft 
that was conducting an engine test.97 Jet wash from the engine caused the tractor’s 
hood to lift up and strike the plaintiff in the head.98 The plaintiff brought an action 
against the manufacturer of the tractor for both design defect and failure to warn.99 
Prior to the accident, the tractor had been taken out of commission because four 
                                                                                                                 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 170 F.3d 264, 266 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 91. Id. at 264. 
 92. Id. at 269 & n.4. 
 93. Id. at 271. 
 94. Brief of Defendant, supra note 84, at *2. 
 95. Judge Calabresi relied on a heeding presumption to conclude that causation was 
established. However, without establishing what the warning should have said, one cannot 
properly conclude that causation has been established. The court’s statement that the burden 
fell on the defendant to prove that the failure to warn was not the cause of the injury rings 
hollow. Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 170 F.3d at 271. The defendant could not rebut the 
presumption without knowing the nature of the warning that the plaintiff proposed. 
 96. No. 01-CV-7644 (SLT)(JMA), 2007 WL 4285377 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2007). 
 97. Id. at *2.  
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at *4–11. 
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components that would have prevented the plaintiff’s injury had been removed.100 
The trial court found that there had been substantial modification of the tractor and 
granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss on the design defect claim.101 Turning to 
the failure to warn claim, the court noted that it was alleged “without much 
specificity”102 but denied summary judgment, holding that there were issues of 
material fact as to whether the plaintiff knew of the danger of the hood flying off its 
hinges as a result of jet wash.103 After a full trial, a jury awarded the plaintiff 
damages in excess of $48 million.104 
After posttrial motions, the trial court upheld the jury finding of failure to warn 
on the grounds that the manufacturer of the baggage tractor knew that its tractors 
could be used in various states of disrepair and that it had a duty to warn that the 
hood, under pressure from jet wash, could invade the passenger compartment and 
cause injury.105 The plaintiff’s testimony that he would have heeded a warning had 
it been given was sufficient to show causation.106 On appeal to the Second Circuit, 
the defendant argued that “plaintiffs’ case was legally insufficient because . . . 
plaintiffs were required to ‘present expert proof regarding the feasibility, actual 
content, form and placement of a proposed warning.’”107 The court rejected the 
defendant’s argument, concluding that a jury could understand the mechanism that 
caused the injury as well as the need for a warning that under extreme pressure from 
jet wash the hood would rotate into the passenger compartment of the tractor.108 
The failure of the court to require the plaintiff to suggest a RAW was crucial to 
a determination of causation in this case. It is not clear whether a warning should 
have been placed on the baggage tractor. Perhaps the warning should have been in 
a user’s manual. If the plaintiff had never looked at or read the user’s manual, then 
causation could not be established. Furthermore, the text of the warning would 
have needed to indicate that the danger from jet wash arose when the other 
component parts of the tractor were missing. The plaintiff was aware, in general, of 
the dangers of jet wash; he claimed not to be aware, however, that without the 
missing components the hood could enter the passenger compartment when 
subjected to jet wash.109 How a warning could have been worded to account for this 
contingency was never raised at trial. Moreover, any chance of determining 
whether a proposed RAW would have prevented the plaintiff’s harm would require 
that such an alternative warning be identified. The court absolved the plaintiff of 
his duty to offer such a warning as part of his prima facie case.110 
                                                                                                                 
 
 100. Id. at *2. 
 101. Id. at *9. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at *9–11. 
 104. Saladino v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 500 F. App’x 69, 70 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 105. Saladino v. Stewart & Stevenson Servs., Inc., 704 F. Supp. 2d 237, 249 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Am. Airlines, Inc., 500 F. App’x at 72–73. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See Stewart & Stevenson Servs., Inc., No. 01-CV-7644 (SLT)(JMA), 2007 WL 
4285377, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2007). 
 110. Other cases that did not require a RAW raise serious questions as to whether, if 
specificity had been required, plaintiffs would have been able to survive a defense motion 
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III. CASES REQUIRING A RAW TO ESTABLISH SPECIFIC CAUSATION 
A few courts have realized that without a RAW they are incapable of deciding 
whether a plaintiff has established causation. In Cuntan v. Hitachi Koki USA, 
Ltd.,111 an experienced carpenter was cutting plywood using a power saw 
manufactured by the defendant. After he removed his finger from the saw’s trigger 
switch to deactivate its motor, the plaintiff set the saw down on a grass surface.112 
According to the plaintiff, the saw continued to operate and it traveled several feet 
across the ground.113 The saw came into contact with the plaintiff’s left hand, 
causing serious injury.114 The plaintiff alleged both design defect and failure to 
warn.115 The court dismissed the design-defect claim because the plaintiff failed to 
present expert testimony as to the availability of a RAD.116 The court then dealt 
with the plaintiff’s claim that the warnings of the risks of an operating blade were 
inadequate because “the warnings ‘should have been prominently displayed on the 
machine with warning labels in color with pictogram [sic] and other remarkable 
language, color and print to make this danger obvious to the operator.’”117 The 
court granted summary judgment for the defendant, holding that even if it were to 
credit the plaintiff’s assertion that a different warning would have altered his 
behavior, “he ha[d] failed to offer any alternatives for the jury to consider.”118 
In Koken v. Black & Veatch Construction, Inc.,119 the insurer of a contractor and 
subcontractor brought suit against Auburn Manufacturing, Inc. for $9 million in 
damages after one of its fire blankets caught fire resulting in extensive damage to a 
generator covered by the blanket.120 The heart of the case was that Auburn had not 
                                                                                                                 
for summary judgment or directed verdict. See, e.g., Ayers v. Johnson & Johnson Baby 
Prods., Co., 818 P.2d 1337 (Wash. 1991) (holding that the plaintiff did not have to provide a 
RAW where the plaintiff’s infant aspirated baby oil that had been transferred to another 
bottle and suffered severe injury). But see Fraust v. Swift & Co., 610 F. Supp. 711 (W.D. Pa. 
1985) (denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment where the plaintiffs alleged 
failure to warn when their sixteen-month-old child suffered brain damage after choking on 
peanut butter, claiming that peanut butter should not be fed to children under four years old 
but not suggesting the text, size, and placement of such a warning); Emery v. Federated 
Foods, Inc., 863 P.2d 426 (Mont. 1993) (denying the defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment where a two-year-old child choked on marshmallows and the plaintiff did not suggest 
the text, size, or placement of a warning); Bryant v. Adams, 448 S.E.2d 832 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1994) (denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment where the plaintiff claimed that 
a trampoline should have had multiple warnings of dangers to users, but did not supply specific 
suggestions as to the text, size, and placement of such a warning); Ayers v. Johnson & Johnson 
Baby Prods., Co., 797 P.2d 527, 533 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (Reed, J., dissenting). 
 111. No. 06-CV-3898 (RRM)(CLP), 2009 WL 3334364 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2009). 
 112. Id. at *2. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at *4. 
 116. Id. at *11. 
 117. Id. at *16 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
 118. Id. at *17. 
 119. 426 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 120. The fire was quickly put out by a fire extinguisher, but the chemicals in the fire 
extinguisher caused damage to the generator. Id. at 43. 
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provided adequate warnings about the possible dangers of fire that might occur 
with the use of its fire blankets. An Auburn fire blanket was used to cover plywood 
that in turn covered the generator.121 While an employee was cutting a steel lug, a 
molten slug fell on the fire blanket, which melted the blanket and precipitated a 
fire.122 The federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
defendant Auburn.123 On appeal to the First Circuit, the plaintiff argued that “it was 
not the plaintiff’s obligation to articulate a particular suggested warning, but rather 
the entire duty to warn question should . . . be thrown to the jury.”124 The court said 
that this position “completely misunderstands the plaintiff’s burden in a negligence 
action. It is the plaintiff’s burden to establish a duty to warn and to prove proximate 
causation of loss resulting from the failure to warn.”125 
The court said that “[t]hankfully, the appellants have not rested on such a 
completely unsupportable position”126 but rather the plaintiff offered four different 
suggested warnings. One suggested warning was that the fire blanket was “1000 
degrees rated.”127 The plaintiff argued that, had the blanket been so labeled, the 
employee would have consulted his foreman.128 The court noted that there was no 
testimony by the foreman as to what he would have done in response to the 
employee’s hypothetical inquiry.129 Nor was there evidence that an ordinary 
employee would have understood what the 1000-degree rating meant with regard to 
its resistance to fire.130 A second suggested warning was that the fire blanket was 
“not suitable for horizontal capture of concentrated spatter and red-hot cut 
pieces.”131 Although such a warning would have been appropriate, the court once 
again found no proximate cause because there was no evidence that there was 
horizontal capture of concentrated spatter or red-hot cut pieces, or that molten slag 
is the equivalent of concentrated spatter.132 The plaintiff’s expert did suggest a third 
possible warning, stating the blanket was “not appropriate for cutting 
operations.”133 However, the expert’s testimony supporting such a warning was 
disqualified since he could not articulate any methodology for determining the 
appropriateness of a 1000-degree rated fire blanket for particular operations.134 
Once the court rejected the proposition that the plaintiff could simply allege that 
a warning should have been given without articulating what the warning should 
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 122. Id. 
 123. Koken v. Auburn Mfg., Inc., No. CIV. 02-83-B-C, 2004 WL 2358194, at *1 (D. Me. 
Oct. 15, 2004). 
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reliability set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 
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have said, the plaintiff-insurer had to make its case based on specific articulated 
warnings. Since the plaintiff was unable to prove that any of the suggested 
warnings would have prevented the damage to the generator, the court was justified 
in upholding summary judgment in favor of the defendant.135 
IV. THE RAW PROPOSAL 
We come to our proposal informed by lessons learned from our experience as 
reporters for the Restatement (Third). In recommending the appropriate test for 
determining design defect in that project, we followed the majority position that 
imposes upon the plaintiff the burden of proving a RAD rather than the minority 
position that allows the plaintiff to recover by merely showing that the product’s 
design disappoints consumer expectations.136 We, like most courts, reject the latter 
test as standardless, collapsing defect and causation into a single issue that a jury is 
permitted to resolve intuitively based on amorphous consumer expectations.137 In 
like fashion, allowing the plaintiff to allege failure to warn without specifically 
setting forth the relevant details—the medium and, if written, the text, placement, 
color, and size of the proposed warning—condones a cause of action without any 
standard and allows a jury to intuit causation without being required to test its 
finding against what a real-world warning would have said. 
The Moran case discussed earlier illustrates the dilemma that drafters of 
warnings invariably face.138 On the one hand, a warning in four-inch red letters on a 
bottle of cologne that reads “FLAMMABLE” is not only ambiguous—it is 
downright misleading. It surely is inappropriate to tell consumers that one should 
not smoke in a room in which the cap has been removed from a cologne bottle. On 
the other hand, a warning that says “Do Not Smoke While Applying Cologne to 
Your Face. It Can Cause a Fire.” is too narrowly focused. A narrowly focused 
warning invites the defendant to argue that other kinds of conduct in which people 
may engage are not mentioned. If this were a valid argument, the defendant would 
be forced to set forth a laundry list of various scenarios that could lead to fire 
hazards. The plaintiff should be required to offer an alternative warning with 
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Inc., No. CIV. 04-CV-14-SM, 2005 WL 2277058 (D.N.H. Sept. 13, 2005); Barban v. Rheem 
Textile Sys., Inc., No. 01-CV-8475 (ILG), 2005 WL 387660 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2005); G.E. 
Capital Corp. v. A.O. Smith Corp., No. 01 Civ.1849 LAP, 2003 WL 21498901 (S.D.N.Y. July 
1, 2003); Morgen v. Ford Motor Co., 797 N.E.2d 1146 (Ind. 2003). 
 136. See Twerski & Henderson, supra note 5, at 1094–1106. 
 137. See OWEN, supra note 23, § 8.3; James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, 
Achieving Consensus on Defective Product Design, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 867, 879–82 (1998); 
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Essay, Intuition and Technology in Product 
Design Litigation: An Essay on Proximate Causation, 88 GEO. L.J. 659, 678–83 (2000). 
 138. Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 332 A.2d 11 (Md. 1975), rev’g Moran v. Williams, 313 
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sufficient specificity to signal a fire risk in some circumstances and then to convince a 
court or jury that such a warning would have avoided injury to the plaintiff. 
We do not pretend that drafting warnings is an easy task, and we recognize that 
fact patterns like Moran are particularly challenging. But the difficulties should not 
be overstated. In many cases, plaintiffs will be able to construct RAWs that are 
sufficiently credible so that a fact finder may conclude that the failures to warn 
caused the injuries suffered by the plaintiffs. We appreciate that courts faced with 
Moran-like problems may be motivated to wink at the formal requisites of the law 
that demand proof of defect and cause; as one of the authors has developed 
elsewhere, what may actually be happening in some of these cases is that courts are 
imposing a form of enterprise liability, in which risk-creating enterprises are held 
strictly liable in tort for the harm their activities cause.139 Liriano may also be such 
a case.140 One can sympathize with Judge Calabresi’s desire to compensate a young 
man who suffered such a tragic injury. However, in doing so he tortured the law of 
warning and causation beyond recognition. Allowing plaintiffs to reach juries in 
these cases might be warranted under an enterprise liability rationale.141 Our point 
here is that requiring a RAW would reveal why traditional failure-to-warn doctrine 
is an inadequate vehicle by which to reach those outcomes. 
It is not our contention that the plaintiff must allege a specific warning at the 
pleading stage. No such requirement is imposed on plaintiffs in cases involving 
design defects. However, analogous to a case based on design defect where the 
plaintiff must, during discovery, set forth with some particularity the alternative 
design that would have avoided or reduced the injury, so in a warning case the 
plaintiff should be required to spell out the text, location, size, and mode of warning 
(verbal or pictorial). Failure to provide the reasonable alternative design or warning 
should allow the defendant to prevail on a motion for summary judgment. In both the 
design and warning situations, whether the plaintiff has provided sufficient detail for 
the alternative design or warning calls for judicial discretion. If the trial judge finds 
that adequate detail has been provided, the issue becomes one for the trier of fact. 
Once the plaintiff sets forth the RAW, the defendant will likely argue that the 
proposed warning would not have made a difference and that the plaintiff has not 
proven specific causation. Furthermore, the defendant may argue that if the RAW 
proffered by the plaintiff should have been given, a multiplicity of warnings of the 
same risk level would have to be given as well. Thus, once the plaintiff must 
articulate the RAW with some specificity, the defendant is in a position to support 
the claim that the RAW would either have been ineffectual or would have spawned 
a spate of warnings that would have created sensory overload and would have 
rendered the suggested RAW practically useless. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 139. See generally James A. Henderson, Jr., Echoes of Enterprise Liability in Product 
Design and Marketing Litigation, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 958 (2002) (arguing that courts 
sometimes impose sensible forms of enterprise liability by stretching traditional doctrine 
beyond its limits). 
 140. Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 170 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 141.  See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSION 
Design-defect and failure-to-warn cases share the same structural elements. Just as 
the defendant cannot defend a case premised on defective design without knowing 
the specifics of how the plaintiff would redesign the product to make it safer, so with 
regard to defective warnings the plaintiff cannot challenge the reasonableness of the 
defendant’s marketing or whether better warnings would have saved the plaintiff 
from injury without knowing the specifics of the proposed warnings. No court would 
accept as adequate a statement by the plaintiff that she has a general idea for a RAD, 
and no court should accept a similar generalization for a RAW. 
For understandable reasons, failure to warn is a doctrine that has tended to lack 
rigor. It is altogether too easy to conclude that a product seller should have said 
something more in order to alert a user or consumer about a risk. However, even 
when one can establish that there was a failure to warn, tort law requires that the 
omission be causally related to the plaintiff’s injury. That many courts have 
adopted a presumption that if a warning had been given it would have been 
heeded142 does not resolve the causation problem identified in this Article. In 
fairness, the defendant cannot rebut the heeding presumption unless the plaintiff 
identifies the warning that should have been given. One of the authors suspects that 
some form of enterprise liability may best describe the courts’ reactions to the 
difficulties described herein.143 But given the certainty that courts will continue to 
apply a failure-to-warn analysis, we argue that the plaintiff should be required to 
prove a RAW to establish a prima facie case. It is our hope that this Article will 
serve as the beginning of a fruitful dialogue. 
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